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Articles
SOME REFLECTIONS ON GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS
GORDON G. YOUNG*
This article comments on several aspects of Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings (GRH or the Act),' the federal law enacted in December of
last year, which purports to transfer major congressional budgetary
powers to an administrative apparatus. The comments are divided
into three parts. The first part concludes that the courts should not
automatically assume that post-GRH appropriations bills are in-
tended to operate within GRH's framework. The second part looks
at the separation of powers challenges to GRH currently proceeding
in the courts.2 It concludes that, if the Supreme Court decides the
delegation doctrine issue, it should, and probably will, for the first
time since the 1930s, use that ground to invalidate a federal law.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. Thanks are
due the law school's reference librarians and a large number of my colleagues who, as
usual, were extremely generous with their help.
1. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
177, 99 Stat 1037 (1985) [hereinafter cited as GRH].
2. As this article was prepared for publication, the challenges to GRH continued
making their way through the courts. The resulting flux affects only the middle portion
of this article. Only papers filed with the district court on or before January 8, 1986
were considered for that section.
On February 7, 1986, a three-judge district court voted to strike down GRH oil the
ground that congressional power to remove the Comptroller General made the delega-
tion to that office a violation of separation of powers doctrine. Synar v. United States,
Nos. 85-3945, 85-4106, slip. op. at 34-50 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 1986) (available Feb. 28, 1986,
on LEXIS, Genfed library). In what it clearly described as dictum, that court rejected
the general antidelegation argument and concluded that the powers which GRH at-
tempted to grant the Comptroller General could be given to a proper delegate. Id. at
13-28. An appeal is currently pending before the Supreme Court. 54 U.S.L.W. 3548
(1986).
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The third part examines GRH in the context of the recent separa-
tion of powers decisions by the Court and the current debate on the
construction of our Constitution. It also examines the current Ad-
ministration's position on such matters because that position may
have some influence upon current or future Justices. It concludes
that disturbing signs indicate that both the Court and the Adminis-
tration sometimes adopt a Framers' intent approach to individual
provisions of the Constitution and, at other times, ignore such an
approach in favor of adjusting the Constitution to the times. Either
approach, applied consistently and deftly, could conserve the rela-
tive balance of power between Congress and the executive branch,
roughly as envisioned by the Framers. The inconsistent use of both
approaches threatens to upset that balance.
1. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings As a Dictionary Act
A reading of the Congressional debates, 3 the newspaper ac-
counts,4 and the briefs in the cases attacking Gramm-Rudman-Hol-
lings on constitutional grounds5 reveals a common, and potentially
significant, misconception about the Act's effect. GRH is described
as a measure by which Congress has delegated to administrative au-
thorities, for six years if not repealed, the power to cut each annual
budget deficit by specified amounts if Congress itself cannot. 7 This
3. See 131 CONG. REC. S17,385 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1985) (Remarks of'SenatorJohn-
ston); id. at S17,439 (Remarks of Senator Hawkins); id. at S14,920 (daily ed. Nov. 6.
1985) (Remarks of Senator Pell).
4. N. Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1985, at B8, col. 4; id., Dec. 12, 1985, at AI, col. 6.
5. Memorandum of Speaker and Bipartisan Leadership Group of the House of Rep-
resentatives Regarding Balanced Budget and Deficit Control Act at 4, National Treasury
Employees Union v. United States, No. 85-4106 (D.D.C. Feb. 7. 1986 sub nora. Svnar v.
United States) (available Feb. 28, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library) [hereinafter cited as
Speaker Memorandum]:
All the significant versions of the Act, preliminary and final alike, shared the
central principle which may be called "automaticity," namely, that the key de-
termination to trigger the Act's across-the-board cuts had to be made
automatically.
See also Memorandum of Intervenor United States Senate in Support of its Motions to
Dismiss and in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Sunmry Judgment at 4, Swnar v.
United States, No. 85-3945 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 1986) (available Feb. 28. 1986, on lI1XIS,
Genfed library) Ihereinafter cited as Senate Memorandum 1. Synar and .Vet-oal Treastiq
Employees were consolidated on January 2, 1986. See Memorandum in Support of Plain-
tiffs' Motion for SummaryJudgment at 2. ational Treasury Employees. The plaintills' con-
stitutional arguments are discussed infra at notes 23-62 and accompanying text. On
February 7, 1986, the district court held GRH to be unconstitutional, and the parties
appealed to the Supreme Court. See supra note 2.
6. For the relevance of implied repealers, see infra note 20 and accompanying text.
7. For examples of congressional debates, newspaper accounts, and briefs evidenc-
ing such a view, see supra notes 3-5.
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correctly describes what the language of the Act attempts,' but it
cannot accurately describe its operation. Upon appropriations bills
passed after its effective date, GRH can operate only to the extent
that any such later bill expressly or impliedly incorporates it by ref-
erence. Thus, when Congress "appropriates $200 million" for this
or for that, the question must be asked: Did Congress intend to
appropriate subject to GRH or not subject to it?
Surely there can be no question that either option is open to
Congress. Congress cannot bind its future self not to pass laws of
certain sorts: to do that would require a constitutional amendment.
In light of this basic fact of the legislative process, it is clear that
GRH will operate, however obscurely, only as something of a "dic-
tionary act," which attempts to legislate methods for construing
later statutes. The Dictionary Act of 1871, ' and more recently the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),' ° provide other examples of
this kind of legislation. At the most, GRH seeks to require courts to
read future appropriations bills as subject to GRH unless they con-
tain express language opting out. At the least, it entreats courts to
harmonize future law with GRH and may provide some evidence of
the probable later intent of Congress.
While the federal courts have never squarely addressed the va-
lidity of a dictionary act, there are indications of limits on the power
of Congress to control the interpretation of future laws. First, one
state supreme court has struck down, on separation of powers prin-
ciples, a state statute compelling the use of certain canons of statu-
tory construction.'' Second, reason dictates the existence of limits
on Congress' power to interfere with the courts' performance of
their duty to ascertain the intent of the legislature's last pronounce-
ment on a subject. To take a clear example, surely one Congress
could not, through elaborate and obscure requirements that only
"magic words" be used, make it difficult for successor legislatures to
accomplish what they prescribe clearly in ordinary English. While
the federal courts have never confronted such an extreme case as
that just posed, the case law record contains strong evidence of the
courts' sense, if not conscious understanding, that they, and not the
legislature, must ultimately determine how to read legislative intent.
8. See GRH § 201(a)(7) (defining maximum dcficit amount for years 1986-91);
§§ 251(a)(I)(A)-(C), (a)(2), (b)(1), (b)(2)(a); § 252(a)(I).
9. Act of Feb. 25, 1871, 16 Stat. 431 (1871).
10. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1982).
11. People v. Crawford l)istrib. Co., 53 111.2d 332. 338-39, 291 N.E.2d 648. 652
(1973). See W. REYNOLDS, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN A NrrsIIE.m. § 5.15 (1980).
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The Supreme Court, in its decisions under the Administrative
Procedure Act, seems to recognize the possibility that Congress can
abuse its control of statutory construction. 'I The Court's actual po-
sition may well go beyond this. It apparently acknowledges that any
"dictionary act" controls interpretation only to the extent that a
court believes that the act helps to ascertain the real intent when it
exists or, in default of such intent, a reasonable result. For example,
in Mitchum v. Foster, " the Supreme Court found that a later statute
created an implied exception to an earlier statute that said it permit-
ted only express exceptions.' 4 The driving force behind that deci-
sion, it seems, was the majority's sense of a real, but unexpressed,
intent to exempt the later law from the operation of the earlier
one. 15
It is not my position that Congress is without a role to play in
determining how later legislation will be read. It is rather that the
courts themselves must decide, in light of a variety of policies, pre-
cisely what weight should be given to earlier statutes that would
control the meaning of future legislation. There are two ways of
articulating this view. The first would deny any binding effect to
dictionary acts, but concede that courts should weigh them carefully
because of their relevance to interpretation. The second would
ascribe binding effect to such acts, but only when the courts deter-
mine that doing so does not frustrate the ability of the courts to give
effect to the most recently expressed will of Congress. These two
12. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (195-5).
13. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
14. Id. at 231-43. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), authorizes
a "suit in equity"-and thus, implicitly, an injunction-against state officers. The Court
found § 1983 to be an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, Act of Mar. 2, 1793, 1 Stat.
335 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982)), which bars federal courts from enjoining state
court proceedings. 407 U.S. at 242-43.
15. The Court explained its decision as an interpretation of the word "express" in
the earlier statute to include not simply clear words in a later law, but also clear legisla-
tive intent not literally expressly included in the text. See id. at 237-38. However it may
be rationalized, I believe that the relationship of the courts to the legislative process
requires consideration of evidence of later intent, despite the mandates of the earlier
law. I believe that if pressed by a law that, even more clearly than that involved in
Mitchum, required future exceptions to its provisions to be express, the Court would make
clear its freedom to ignore the earlier law in favor of the implicit but clear intent of a
later law. It is, however, difficult to imagine how a statute could be clearer than the anti-
injunction act involved in Mitchumi without resorting to drafting such as "express and we,
really mean express." Because never so pressed, the Court has either never considered
the problem or used the host of typical avoidance devices. As said earlier, conscious or
subconscious sensitivity to these concerns on the part of the courts, and perhaps Con-
gress as well, has led to the issues being framed differently and resolved reasonably
without confrontation.
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positions are approximately the same, because in each the court
would view itself as in control, willing and able to ignore earlier stat-
utes which infringe on the court's role as interpreter of law.
The federal courts seem never to have expressly recognized
their ultimate control largely because it is normally reasonable for a
court to give great weight to earlier dictionary acts. Indeed as to
earlier legislation such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' 6 or
the APA, which control the meaning of future legislation through
control of the environment in which it will operate, it normally
seems reasonable for courts to ignore the sort of issue that I am
raising. I have no quarrel with viewing such acts as operative until
repeal, and not simply hortatory, as long as it is recognized that the
context or structure of a later enactment, if extraordinary, may merit
the conclusion that the later Congress chose to opt out. It would be
exhausting and generally unproductive, in the absence of over-
whelming evidence, for the courts to consider, on an individual ba-
sis, whether new causes of action were to be adjudicated using some
or all of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and whether new
agency authority is subject to some or all of the APA. 7 Indeed, it is
normally fair to assume that any current Congress would prefer the
relatively mindless, across-the-board application of such rules to the
chaos which would result from attempted case-by-case adjustments.
GRH, however, poses a different case. It is not collateral but
central, in any fair sense, to the meaning of future appropriations
bills whether the sums they purport to provide may be taken at face
value or as a ceiling subject to great reduction at the hands of ad-
ministrators. The stakes are enormous, both in terms of the poten-
tial effect on the federal government and on the development of law
dealing with the power of Congress to delegate responsibility for
major structural economic decisions to other decisionmakers. For
this reason, if the Court is inclined to allow the bureaucracy to make
such budget cuts, it should consider taking the unusual step of re-
quiring annual renewals of GRH in order for it to continue in opera-
tion. This would amount to a recognition that Congress may no
longer intend to legislate subject to GRH, but, politically, may be
16. Although such rules are made by the courts under a congressional grant of
rulemaking power, 28 U.S.C. § 2070 (1982), they are accorded the force of law and are
equivalent to legislation for my purpose.
17. Cf. United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973) (interpreting Inter-
state Commerce Act requirement for decisions after hearing in light of the APA).
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unable to pass a repealer because it fears, for example, a Presiden-
tial veto. GRH was enacted with broad yet thin support"8 and has
been called the least lobbied major bill in recent memory.' ' The
essence of the moral and legal charge against GRH is congressional
abdication. When it is difficult to know just what Congress intends,
an error on the side of reassertion of the ordinary legislative process
seems less perverse than the reverse.2 0 Under all of these circum-
stances, the Court should reverse its usual presumption that an ear-
lier expressed will of Congress controls future legislation. 2'
The Court may well be unwilling to reverse its presumption of
continued applicability based simply upon the policies discussed
above. For appropriations bills passed shortly after GRH that spark
little debate about that Act, the Court may reasonably conclude that
18. As for the breadth of support (1) the vote in the House of Representatives was
271 for, 154 against, 9 not voting, 131 CONG. REC. HI 1,903-04 (daily ed. Dec. 12. 1985);
the vote in the Senate was 61 for, 31 against, 5 not voting, 2 paired, id. at S 17,443-44
(daily ed. Dec. I1, 1985). As for the thinness of support, Congressional Quarterly reported
that many members of Congress felt GRH unwise and unworkable and that Sponsor
Rudman himself referred to the bill as a "bad idea whose time has come." 43 CONG. Q
2604 (1985).
19. A Senate staff member of the author's acquaintance characterized GRH this way.
Published accounts agree: "Many members reported little overt lobbying either for or
against the legislation, except for strong, last-minute objections from the defense de-
partment." 43 CONG. Q 2604 (1985).
20. Objections citing the presumption against implied repealer are to be anticipated,
but are beside the point. The question is not one of GRH's repealer, but rather of its
operation while in effect. It can be nothing more than hortatory in its aim that future
money bills be subject to its dictates. It can be nothing more than persuiasive. to an
extent to be determined by a court, if seen as an attempt to provide presumptions
through which later legislation is to be read.
21. A wide variety of reasons other than lack of majority support could account lo-
the failure of a Congress that had turned against GRH to attempt express repealer. (.
Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative Histon
, 
in the 1981 Supreme Coutt Term, 68
IOWA L. REV. 195, 206 n.90 (1983) (Court assumes substantive, rather than tactical or
political, reasons for Congress' failure to pass legislation to change administrative inter-
pretation). It may be tempting, psychologically, to take the position that a Congress
which had not the political will to pass a repealer should not be helped by the courts.
Either as a punitive position or as one requiring clear signals for the courts own conven-
ience, such a position does not recommend itself. The punitive view goes beyond poetic
justice in inflicting harm, not only on Congress. but also on those Congress exists to
serve. The clear signal approach is valid in its place-for example, the parol evidence
rule and statute of frauds. It is even valid to a point in the setting of a dictionary act's
application. For that reason, I see nothing pernicious in applying the Administrative
Procedure Act when no strong evidence of contrary intent appears. When, as here.
there are serious questions of unconstitutional congressional abdication of power and
when there is strong implicit evidence of intent to legislate independently ol an earlier
measure, the calculus is different. It is one thing for the Court to create a presumption
more likely than not to represent intent. It is another fur it to ignore its own strongly
held view of intent, in favor of a presumption serving only ease of labor.
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the consensus which produced GRH continues. The passage of
time and widespread statements in floor debate of intent to legislate
outside of GRH may, however, raise a reasonable doubt about con-
tinued consensus.22  Surely, in those circumstances, it would be
more reasonable for the Court to require the legislative process to
reindorse this unusual legislation.
2. The Court Challenges Based on Separation of Powers Doctrine
Of more likely immediate impact than the issues discussed
above is the constitutional challenge to GRH currently pending in
the Supreme Court. The two suits recently decided by the special
three-judge federal district court23 attacked GRH on two main
22. There have already been some skirmishes in the Congress over opting out of
GRH. In one case, there is a frontal attack, attempting an express exemption for a par-
ticular money bill. See 132 CONG. REC. H 1093 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1986) (description of
H.R. 4391 as exempting certain veterans benefits from sequestration). In another, bear-
ing more directly on my arguments, there were apparent attempts implicitly to override
GRH as to funding for a particular program. See 44 CONG. Q 595 (1986). One provi-
sion passed the House of Representatives, despite claims by the Reagan Administration
that it would violate GRH spending restrictions. Id. This provision, a proposed amend-
ment to H.R.J. Res. 534, would have added one billion dollars to a program for loans to
farmers. It required hours of cajoling by Senate Republican leaders before the measure
was defeated, then, by a large majority. Id. The pressures to opt out of GRH for popu-
lar programs are enormous and they will grow as its provisions for later years require
vastly deeper cuts.
An interesting problem would arise if many members of Congress stated on the
record in debates over an appropriations bill that they did not intend to legislate subject
to GRH, but the President signed the bill with a message stating a contrary intent. The
relevance, to statutory construction, of the express intent of the President in signing a
bill has been almost completely neglected in cases and scholarly commentary. Notable
exceptions include W. REYNOLDS, LEGAL PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL 234 (1980). Whether I
agree with Professor Reynolds' statement that executive intent is entitled to weight
equal to that accorded legislative intent depends upon how that statement is inter-
preted. The Constitution clearly contemplates that the process of passing a bill be
proactive, that of vetoing reactive. Consequently, perhaps a President's statements that
he or she understands a bill in a particular, way generally should not contribute to fixing
its meaning. Thus, the Presidential influence should be less than that of clearly influen-
tial statements made in legislative debates. On the other hand, it may be lair to say that
the Constitution contemplates that, within reason, Presidents know that to which they
assent. Fo what extent must they analyze cominitee reports and debates and bet on tie
otilcolc of' a judicial process which considers stch materials? The answers arc not
clear. Perhaps, in cases where, on language alone, there is one clearly prefi'rablc mean-
ing of an act as to a particular issue, a President should be able to secure that meaning
by expressly endorsing it. The courts would in effect allow the President, "by opting or
the words,, to eliminate or vastly reduce the relevance of legislative history. Note that
adopting this approach will tnot solve problems under (;RH or other dictionary acts.
because there the precise issue is not the language of the act being construed. but how
inttch locus should be Placed tlpont earlier legislation in arriving at later tmcatiing.
23. See sapra note 2.
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grounds: (1) improper delegation of legislative power, in the Pan-
ama Refining -4 and Schechter "21 line of argument and (2) delegation of
legislative power to an improper delegate, in the Buckley v. Valeo" -
line.
The first argument has not been deployed successfully against a
federal statute since 1935, when the Court declared that legislative
standards, channeling the discretion granted, are necessary for con-
stitutional delegations of legislative power. 27 Since that time, the
Court, while incanting the need for statutory standards, has allowed
the delegation of vast powers to regulate the economy despite little
statutory guidance as to the policies to be pursued.28
Long thought dead or near dead as a constitutional limitation
with real world bite,29 the delegation theory has enjoyed at least a
minor renaissance in Supreme Court dicta in the 1970s and 1980s.
In 1974, in National Cable Television Association v. United States, ° five
Justices, including three currently on the Court (Justices Burger,
Rehnquist, and White) construed a statute in one of two possible
ways to avoid what they perceived to be a serious possibility that the
other construction would fail if analyzed in terms of constitutional
limits on delegation.3' Some congressional powers, the majority
suggested, might fall within a legislative core and, hence, be either
undelegable or delegable only under very stringent limits and
protections.32
In 1980, in Industrial Union v. American Petroleum Institute,33 three
Justices, including one not involved in Cable T.V (Justice Stevens),
24. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
25. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
26. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
27. S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 90
(1985).
28. See generally I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 3:1-3:10 (2d ed. 1978)
(discussing delegation doctrine and its abandonment). For examples of cases upholding
delegations despite vague standards, see Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944);
Sunshine Anthracite Coal Corp. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940); United States v. Rock
Royal Co-operatives, 307 U.S. 533 (1939).
29. See 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 28.
30. 415 U.S. 336 (1974).
31. Id. at 342. The statute allowed the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
to impose a filing fee based on, inter alia, the "public policy or interest served.- The
Court feared that such a consideration would transform the fee into a tax, which could
be imposed only by Congress. Id. at 341. Thus, the Court determined that the "public
policy or interest served" criterion did not apply; rather, the FCC should base its fees on
the "value to the recipient" of its services. Id. at 342-43.
32. Id. at 340-42.
33. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
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construed a statute somewhat narrowly to avoid possible problems
with the delegation doctrine.34 Although he concurred in the judg-
ment, Justice Rehnquist would have found the delegation unconsti-
tutional because the statute lacked sufficient standards to guide the
delegate's discretion. Dissenting in a case the following year, and
this time joined by the ChiefJustice, Justice Rehnquist favored strik-
ing down a delegation that he saw as so standardless that it consti-
tuted an abdication of Congress' policymaking responsibility. 3 6
Based on the opinions described above, four current Justices
seem to take the delegation doctrine quite seriously; at least three of
them may still believe in the existence of core legislative powers that
are at least relatively undelegable. Moreover, all four believe that
the presence of meaningful standards, at least when possible, is a
requirement for a valid delegation. Justices Blackmun, Powell, and
O'Connor have not made known their position on delegation. Still,
the fact that four of their colleagues, and the two Justices most re-
cently retired from the Court, are on record as willing to scrutinize
delegations suggests a likelihood that at least one of the uncommit-
ted Justices would take a similar position. Indeed, even Justices
Brennan and Marshall, who have suggested that virtually anything
goes after the movement away from Schechter and Panama,37 might
well view the delegation in GRH as of a different order.
GRH allows agencies to determine, by estimating the size of the
deficits, how much to cut federal spending otherwise authorized by
Congress. Even if it must be constantly renewed by Congress to be
effective,3" that power is potentially greater in impact than any dele-
gated so far. GRH will reduce outlays in fiscal year 1986 by roughly
4.5%.3"' The magnitude of the cuts required in following fiscal years
has been estimated to be as high as 27.1% of nonexempt,
nondefense programs. 4' As a result, the delegation argument
should get thoughtful attention from the Court.
34. Id. at 646, 652. Although Justice Powell concurred in the construction of the
statute, he expressed no view about a different interpretation's violating the delegation
doctrine. Id. at 664 n. I (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in theJuldgment).
35. Id. at 686 (Rehnquist, J.. concurring in the judgment).
36. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. l)onovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543 (1981) (Rehnquist,
., dissenting).
37. National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 344 (1974); FPC
v. New England Power Co.. -I15 t I.S. 345, 352-60 (1974) (Marshall and Brennan, l..
dissenting).
38. See spra notes 3-2 1 and accompanying text.
39. 44 CoNc. Q. 135 (1986).
40. Id. at 138.
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The threshold issue is whether the power to determine the defi-
cit size and, hence the cuts, involves the kind and quantity of discre-
tion that conceivably could trigger antidelegation analysis. First,
should the power to make predictions be characterized as delegated
lawmaking power if the predictions themselves have immediate legal
consequences? Certainly, in GRH Congress may have envisioned
an administrative mental process different from that expected from
those involved in ordinary administrative rulemaking. Still, if there
is room for and incentive to manipulate the predictions in order to
alter the state of the law, such predictive powers could be used to
the same effect as rulemaking power. Even assuming utmost good
faith on the part of those administering GRH, if reasonable, quali-
fied forecasters could make vastly different predictions, delegation
of predictive powers seems as much an abdication of congressional
responsibility as delegated rulemaking. Therefore, delegation of
the power to make such predictions should be judged by the stan-
dards applicable to delegations of lawmaking authority."
Accepting this analysis, the amount of discretion is the crucial
issue. That amount seems to depend upon the extent of agreement
41. The early cases sustaining what later commentators view as a species of dele-
gated lawmaking authority involved rules prescribed in a statute which conditioned their
operation upon the existence of a fact or facts to be found by the executive branch. The
Court typically treated the executive involvement as one of factfinding and not dele-
gated lawmaking power. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); The Brig Aurora, II U.S.
(7 Cranch) 382 (1813). For discussion of these cases, see W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE, & P.
STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 52-54 (7th ed. 1979).
For the Court to conclude that legislative power has been delegated, it must first
conclude that the authority given to the agency apparatus in GRH is more than the
power to find ordinary facts mechanically. Such a conclusion should be easy given the
generally controversial nature of economic projections. Even so, to conclude a delega-
tion occurred, the Court must then distinguish or overrule Aurora and (ark, both of
which made the operation of international trade rules dependent upon rather complex
political or economic judgments characterized as factfinding. In ,iurora, for example, the
key question was whether certain warlike activities had ceased. II U.S. (7 Cranch) at
388. In Field. it was whether foreign tariffs on United States goods were "reciprocally
unequal and unreasonable." 143 U.S. at 680-81. l'here is obviously room, over a wide
variety of stales of the world, for reasonable people, even those from similar educational
and political sucultres, to differ as to the existence of situations so described. Conse-
quently, there is precedent for the constitutionality of stich "actfinding."
I)espite this, it is diflicilt to believe that a modern Court would not recognize that,
at least in cases of blatl ant staidardlessness, what is characterized as lictIi nding is in fict
discretionary lawiaking power. If the Court rccoglizcs this, then tile conclusion is in tm
atttomnatic invalidity, but rather that tie delegation dottriule in its pr'sent fni (ll is tile
appropriate test of constittionality. At this stage, tie allolit l oftrie discretion gralnted
Ibect'ones relevant becatse it seeius a c )ulponlt of delcgat iou doctrine analsis oil ally
vw (If that uctdorine. Il stnl, a finding that sigiilicant discretion has been vested ini di
(;RI agencies is likely to be necessary, first, to justilf the ap)lication il delegatfim doc-
rilue analysis anid, second, to a conclusion o1" ins alidity unlu its application.
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on the method for predicting revenues and outlays, and especially
for predicting major contributing factors such as real growth, inter-
est rates, and unemployment. The Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), which
make the initial determination under GRH and average their conclu-
sions when they do not agree, came within $.8 billion dollars of each
other's estimate of an approximately $221 billion deficit for fiscal
year 1986.42 This consensus may cause some to conclude that the
prediction is simply a mechanical one. It seems more reasonable,
however, to view it as an aberration. Past gross disparities in similar
predictions suggest an immense amount of discretion in making the
predictions. For example, the OMB predicted a deficit of $91.5 bil-
lion for fiscal year 1983, the first full fiscal year under President Rea-
gan; the actual deficit was $195.5 billion.4"
In addition to the discretion involved, the availability ofjudicial
review is an important, related factor in determining the validity of
attempted delegations. From the perspective of scholarly commen-
tators at least, Judge Harold Levanthal wrote the most influential
modern opinion dealing with the delegation doctrine in Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Connally.4 4 Rejecting the extremes of carte blanche
power to delegate and per se condemnation of delegation, he
stressed an approach that considered not only the need for delega-
tion and the relative clarity of the legislative directions to the dele-
gate, but also the presence of protections from abuse, particularly
the availability ofjudicial review. Justice Rehnquist, in his 1980 con-
currence in Industrial Union v. American Petroleum Institute, also placed
great weight on the availability of meaningful judicial review in
judging the constitutionality of a delegation.45 GRH, it is worth not-
ing, provides that no court shall review the "data, assumptions or
methodologies" underlying the final administrative determination
42. Sequestration Report for Fiscal Year 1986 - A Joint Report to the Comptroller
General of the United States, 51 Fed. Reg. 1923 (1986).
43. 131 CONG. REC. S 14,905 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1985). An excellent description of the
difficulties involved in predicting the size of deficits can be found in some of Senator
Moynihan's remarks on GRH and its background. It includes a discussion of recent past
disparities between OMB and CBO predictions on the one hand, and between those
predictions and the actual performance of the economy on the other. Id. at S 14,905-07.
44. 377 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971). One distinguished trio of commentators has
characterized this opinion as "masterful." W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, supra
note 41, at 70 n. 1. A majority of the Supreme Court itself has cited V1eal Culers in
addition to its own most basic opinions on the delegation doctrine. See Eastlake v. For-
cst City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 675 (1976).
45. See 448 U.S. at 2886-87. (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgnent).
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of the deficits by the Comptroller General.46
Some conclusions follow. If the Court concludes, as much evi-
dence indicates, that the deficit-determining function under GRH is
not simply a mechanical process, but involves substantial discretion,
then the Act may well be overturned on delegation grounds. So
viewed, GRH abdicates to bureaucrats a key political decision cut-
ting across all areas of federal activity. Congress wants such deci-
sions to be made initially by a mindless averaging of two
predictions, which is then subject to revision in some ill-defined, un-
reviewable way by a third bureaucrat. It may be too much to ask
Congress itself to make all substantive federal policy ranging from
aviation to zoology. These problems of micromanagement are what
delegated lawmaking authority was designed for and, indeed, pro-
vide a major justification for federal administrative agencies. GRH
is different. In light of the potential across-the-board effects on fed-
eral programs, is it too much to require Congress to determine for
itself annually, with all the advice that it wants from OMB, CBO, and
others, the crucial political fact of this and probably the next several
years? I suspect that the Supreme Court may well think not.
The second attack on GRH assumes, for purposes of argument,
that the power to cut the budget described above can be delegated
to some administrative agency, but asserts that the Constitution pro-
hibits the choice of delegates made in GRH. To understand this
argument, one must understand its origins in the administrative law
revolution of the 1930s and 1940s. During those years it became
established that Congress could part with some of its legislative
power. 47 Although the lines between executive discretion and law-
making are inherently blurred, by 1950 it was clear to any thought-
ful lawyer that the Constitution, as originally understood, had been
changed to allow nonlegislative branch "legislation. ' 48 This change
created a problem: How should constitutional provisions and doc-
trine written and evolved without the institution of delegated law-
making in mind be applied to this new institution? In particular,
how should the repositories of such powers be appointed and
removed?
46. GRH § 274(h).
47. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
48. "Delegation of power to administration is the dynamo of the modern social ser-
vice state .... It must be admitted that in the field of federal administration the [an-
tidelegationi doctrine as it operates today is essentially a caveat, a hint of reserved
power." Jalfee, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power: I1, 47 COLtiM. L. RXv'. 561, 592
(1947). Other passages are also interesting. Id. at 577-81, 592-93. See also 1 K. D.vis,
supra note 28 (discussing abandonment of nondelegation doctrine).
[VOL. 45:1
REFLECTIONS ON GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS
In 1935, the Court made clear in Humphrey's Executor"4( that Con-
gress could limit the President's usual power to remove some of the
officers appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate. 5' An earlier decision of the Court elaborating, not the constitu-
tional text, but separation of powers implications drawn from its
structure, had held that, at least as to some executive branch of-
ficers, the President had absolute power of dismissal.5 ' Humphrey's
Executor limited the implications of that decision and enabled the es-
tablishment of the independent regulatory agencies, which are
called that precisely because they are exempt from Presidential re-
moval pressures.52
Buckley v. Valeo,53 in 1974, dealt with the other portion of the
problem: Must all repositories of delegated legislative power be of-
ficers of the United States, appointed by and with the consent of the
Senate? Some of the officers of the Federal Election Commission,
which had the power to make regulations limiting campaign contri-
butions, were appointed not by the President with senatorial con-
sent, but directly by officers of Congress.5 4 The Court found this
arrangement constitutionally impermissible. Anyone possessing
significant authority under the laws of the United States was an "of-
ficer of the United States" within the meaning of Article II's ap-
pointment provision,5 5 and hence must be appointed by the
President with senatorial consent.56
This decision contributed to the continuously unfolding pro-
cess of mapping the old rules of separation of powers onto the new
49. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
50. Id. at 631-32.
51. Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
52. 295 U.S. at 626-32.
53. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
54. Id. at 113. Officers of Congress appointed six of the Commission's eight mem-
bers; only four of these six had voting privileges. For a description of the Commission,
including its powers and the methods for appointing commissioners, see id. at 109-113.
55. Id. at 125-26. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 recognizes two methods of appoint-
ment of "officers of the United States." First, for all such officers, it recognizes Presi-
dential appointment with senatorial advice and consent. Second, for officers other than
"Ambassadors," "Ministers," "Consuls," and "Judges of the Supreme Court," Con-
gress may by law vest the appointment power in "the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments." Because it has not been used, the second provision was implicated in
none of the cases under discussion. Nevertheless, note that it does not authorize legisla-
tion vesting appointment power in Congress or its officers.
56. 424 U.S. at 140-41. Superficially, Buckley might be read as concerned solely with
appointments of those exercising purely executive functions such as enforcement. See id.
at 138. Through the breadth of its statements covering all significant authority under
federal law, id. at 141, Buckler makes clear, however, that those possessing delegated
lawmaking authority are within its sweep.
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institution of delegated lawmaking. As a result of the Court's broad
definition of "officer of the United States" in Buckley, Congress is
free to retain its lawmaking power or to delegate it to executive
branch officers or independent agencies. It may not, however,
"delegate" to parts of itself or even to both houses acting together
without the President's participation.57
Both the appointment and the removal of officers participating
in decisions under GRH pose problems for that legislation, as the
plaintiffs' briefs in the two cases make clear. Recall that the OMB
and CBO make the initial determinations under GRH. If they do
not agree, they average their conclusions. The Comptroller Gen-
eral, the head of the General Accounting Office (GAO), then re-
views their joint report and issues a decision based on that joint
report.58 Congress appoints the director of the CBO; thus, it is clear
that, were the GAO not interposed as a final decisionmaker, GRH's
administrative apparatus would violate the Constitution as elabo-
rated in Buckley.
The congressional plaintiffs argue, in essence, that the GAO's
involvement should be ignored because it is not a meaningful par-
ticipant in the administrative process. 59 Their brief cites the follow-
ing facts: First, the Comptroller General has only a short period-
five days-in which to review the joint OMB-CBO decision.60 Sec-
ond, GRH provides that, if any of its administrative decisionmaking
provisions are struck down, Congress must automatically begin con-
sideration of a budget having the features prescribed by the joint
report.6' This provision gives credence to the plaintiffs' third, more
general, argument: GRH, as revealed by its legislative history, views
57. The "incompatibility clause," U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 2, which prohibits mem-
bers of Congress, during their tenure, from holding "any civil Office under the Author-
ity of the United States," may prevent even a law signed by the President from
accomplishing a delegation of lawmaking authority to Congress or a part of Congress.
The issue is now largely academic, because the Court accomplished the same result in
Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), by interpreting
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3, as allowing Congress to make laws only after complying
with the Constitution's requirements of bicamerality and presentment. 462 U.S. at 952-
57. For further discussion of Chadia, see infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
58. GRH § 251(b)(1) requires the Comptroller General to give "due regard" to the
OMB-CBO report. The report submitted to Congress must explain fully any differences
between the Comptroller's and the OMB-CBO reports. Id. § 251(b)(2).
59. See Memorandum of Plaintiffs in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at
38-48, Synar v. United States, No. 85-3945 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 1986) (available Feb. 28,
1986, on LEXIS, Genfed Library).
60. Id. at 39-40.
61. Id. at 42.
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the Comptroller General as simply a figurehead, placed on the or-
ganization chart to insulate the mechanism from what would other-
wise certainly be a fatal challenge under Buckley." 2
GRH's supporters respond to these arguments as follows:
First, the GAO need not wait until it has the joint report to prepare
to review it; what must be predicted and the data on which the pre-
dictions will be based are fairly clear.63 Second, the legislative his-
tory makes clear that the House of Representatives insisted upon
the insertion of the Comptroller General as the final meaningful
decisionmaker because it did not trust economic predictions to
which the OMB significantly contributed.' This was true, accord-
ing to the briefs, because OMB's earlier unrealistic predictions of
real economic growth, which it used to argue for the 1981 tax cut,
angered the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives.65
Since GRH's enactment, the Comptroller General has shown some
independence,66 which is probably unreviewable by the courts even
if challenged. 67 As a result of this and of what would certainly be a
reluctance to find congressional subterfuge unless beyond doubt, it
seems unlikely that the courts will dispute the Comptroller's place
as final decisionmaker.
The Justice Department has, however, indicated that it will chal-
lenge the Comptroller's office itself as a constitutionally impermissi-
ble delegate.68 With this delegate, there are no problems under
Buckley: by statute the Comptroller General is appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 69 Thus, the
GAO seems, on the surface, a valid independent regulatory agency.
The arguments about the Comptroller General's ineligibility center
on the provisions for removal. No remotely comparable act creating
62. See id. at 40-42.
63. Senate Memorandum, supra note 5, at 33.
64. Speaker Memorandum, supra note 5, at 16-22, 52.
65. Id.
66. Budget Reduction for Fiscal Year 1986: A Report to the President of the United
States, President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives, 51 Fed.
Reg. 2813-15 (1986). Although the Comptroller General used the same major eco-
nomic assumptions as underlie the OMB-CBOJoint Report and appears to have reached
conclusions only slightly different from those in that report, he apparently believes that
he has the option of employing different assumptions and suggests a willingness to do so
in the future. See id. at 2813-15, 2847.
67. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
68. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 30 n.10, Synar
v. United States, No. 85-3945 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 1986) (available Feb. 28, 1986, on LEXIS,
Genfed Library). The expedited schedule prevented the Department from presenting
its arguments on the merits in this memorandum. Id.
69. 31 U.S.C. § 703(a)(1) (1982).
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an independent agency like GAO has a provision for removal by a
joint resolution of Congress for specified cause.7" The President's
lawyers must object primarily to the fact that, as to the Comptroller
General, the President has lost the typical statutory power to initiate
removal, and in the case when a veto is overridden, to block it.
While this may not seem a serious encroachment, particularly since
Congress is limited to removal for cause, two of the most distin-
guished commentators on administrative law (Jaffee and Nathanson)
saw the status of the Comptroller as subject to serious questioning
on separation of powers grounds.7 '
While one must take very seriously Messrs. Jaffee's and Nathan-
son's concern, it was expressed only as that and not as a judgment
of condemnation. On balance, the GAO seems a permissible repos-
itory. The Constitution does not address removal expressly, and
the constitutional limits on congressional control of removal of
agency heads are constitutional common law. 72 In the context of
agencies meant to be independent of the political branches, there
should be room for a wide variety of solutions to the removal prob-
lem. The Court has developed, and should continue to develop, the
constitutional common law because it must create rules to balance
power in light of its decisions permitting delegated lawmaking pow-
ers. "For cause" removal powers, which allow the President a
meaningful, if non-initiatory, role, seem one reasonable way to bal-
ance power in the absence of textual constitutional prohibitions.
70. See 31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1)(B) (1982). Additionally, as an "officer of the United
States," the Comptroller General is subject to impeachment by the House of Represent-
atives and conviction by the Senate.
The independent regulatory agencies often have commissioners or a director who,
by clear statutory provision, can be removed by a President for specified cause. See, e.g.,
49 U.S.C. § 10301(c) (1982) (President may remove a commissioner of the Interstate
Commerce Commission for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office."): L.
JAFFE & N. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 162 (4th ed. 1976).
In some cases a statute is silent as to removal, leaving an as yet unresolved uncertainty as
to whether some additional Presidential removal powers are to be implied. Id. See, e.g.,
15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (1982) (specifying appointment but not removal process for mem-
bers of Securities and Exchange Commission).
71. See JAFFEE & NATHANSON, supra note 70.
72. The phrase "constitutional common law" refers to the "substructure of substan-
tive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their inspiration and authority from, but
not required by, various constitutional provisions." Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974
Tern-Foreward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1975).
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3. Mapping the Old Constitutional Text onto New Institutions.
GRH, Chadha, and the Reagan Administration's View
of Separation Powers
Ranging well beyond the two specific arguments discussed
above is the relationship of GRH to the Court's and the Reagan Ad-
ministration's recent positions on separation of powers issues. In
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,73 the Court declared
unconstitutional the legislative veto, which had permitted Congress
to allow either one or both houses, acting without Presidential par-
ticipation, to repeal specified agency regulations. As often stated
another way, the legislative veto conditioned the legal efficacy of
agency regulations upon such legislative branch consent.
The Court concluded that, because the legislative veto deter-
mines the state of the law, it is legislation and its intended effects
can be accomplished only by an act of both houses of Congress
presented to the President.74 In reaching such a conclusion, a ma-
jority of the Court seemed blind to the task at hand. 75 This task
requires the Court to continue to give meaning to the Constitution
after it has allowed a major structural departure from the docu-
ment's provisions as originally understood. It is not clear that it is
fair to characterize the legislative veto as the sort of thing the Fram-
ers had in mind in providing a process for legislation: The legisla-
tive veto was a check on a process that could not have existed under
73. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
74. The Court applied U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cls. 2, 3, which specify that laws are
made by an affirmative vote of both houses and presentment to the President for a possi-
ble veto. 462 U.S. at 952-57. In doing so, it apparently concluded that any action of
Congress aimed at altering legal relationships, other than those involving the internal
affairs of the two houses of Congress, must either comply with the requirements of bi-
camerality and presentment in order to be valid or be within one of the few express
constitutional exceptions. Id.
75. In a footnote, the majority attempted to respond to the assertion that the Court
had sanctioned a departure from the Constitution by allowing Congress to delegate law-
making power. 462 U.S. at 953 n.16. According to the majority, the fact that the statute
which delegates lawmaking power also limits the delegate's authority distinguishes dele-
gation from the legislative veto. Id. It is, however, undeniable that within the limits
drawn by the statute the agency is free to convert policy choices into rules having the
force of law. To the extent that the Court continues to allow the broadest delegations
under the most vague standards, the majority's dictinction between delegation and the
legislative veto has little substance. It amounts to a justification of delegation on the
grounds that some limits exist. To the extent that the Court anticipates tightening the
requirements for standards, as suggested in American Petroleum, supra note 33, and .Almeri-
can Textile Manufacturers, supra note 36, the distinction seems more coherent. Still, if the
tightening is not so complete as to leave delegates with no major policymaking func-
tions, delegation is more of a departure than the legislative veto.
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the Constitution as originally understood. The majority did not se-
riously consider how the legislative veto enhanced or disturbed the
balance of the relative powers of the branches in light of agency law-
making. Instead, the Court resorted to the syllogism mentioned
above-the legislative veto changes the law: therefore it is
legislation.
It is as if early mapmakers, in attempting to "map" a flat map
onto a globe, determined that they would preserve both the shapes
and the relative areas of the continents, and then mapped to pre-
serve only the shapes, deeming the areas to take care of themselves.
Of course they do not: topologically both cannot be perfectly pre-
served. 76 One can preserve one or the other almost perfectly or dis-
tort both to some intermediate degrees, but a choice must be made,
a choice best informed by the purpose at hand.7 7 When the Court
changed the topology of the Constitution by allowing virtually limit-
less delegation, it put itself in the position of having to make a
choice between the literal application of other old rules to the new
institutions that it sanctioned or the creation of new rules for the
new institutions aimed at a similar interbranch balance as the old.
The Court responded by making a choice while denying it was doing
SO.
Chadha may be part of a program of more literal or Framer-
oriented constitutional interpretation, at least in the separation of
powers area. If so, Chadha's unarticulated corollary must include
some movement toward recognizing a meaningful delegation doc-
trine, one that would insist that Congress make the main policy
choices and set intelligible limits on agency discretion. If this is the
program of a majority ofJustices,78 then it is at least coherent as the
product of evenhandedness in the application of a theory of consti-
tutional interpretation, whether or not it is desirable in terms of
practical effects or legal or political philosophy. If this is the direc-
tion of the Court, however, GRH seems ill starred unless the Court
does conclude that the administrative apparatus makes a fairly
mechanical decision in determining the size of the deficits.
On the other hand, it would seem inconsistent after Chadha for
76. Mapping and Surveying, 23 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 522 (1985).
77. Id.
78. I am not suggesting that a majority oftheJustices adhere, or even that any single
Justice adheres, to a completely rigid Framers' intent-oriented theory of constitutional
interpretation. There are degrees in these matters. A discussion of the voluminous cur-
rent literature on the proper ways of construing our Constitution is beyond the scope of
this article.
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the Court to uphold GRH, if that Act is seen as conferring discretion
to make momentous decisions. Such a decision would be based on a
double standard of constitutional interpretation, allowing a depar-
ture from the one of the Constitution's most central provisions
granting legislative power to Congress while not allowing the legis-
lative veto, a more modest departure, designed as a check upon the
first.
The Reagan Administration has been opinionated and active in
connection with current constitutional issues, including those in-
volving separation of powers. In Chadha it urged the unconstitu-
tionality of the legislative veto. As for GRH, the President signed it
while questioning its constitutionality,79 and, as discussed above,
the Justice Department plans to attack it under separation of powers
doctrine.
The executive branch is also preparing the first serious chal-
lenge in nearly half a century to the constitutionality of the in-
dependent regulatory agencies.80 Its grounds are nonadherence to
the original view of government's three kinds of powers as con-
signed respectively to three branches, and, with express exceptions,
relatively heremetically sealed therein. For example, Attorney Gen-
eral Meese, who has in general urged a return to the framers' "origi-
nal understanding"'" as the test for constitutional interpretation,
recently applied that view to the question of the legitimacy of in-
dependent regulatory agencies:
Federal agencies performing executive functions are them-
selves properly agents of the executive; they are not 'quasi'
this or 'independent' that. In the tripartite scheme of gov-
ernment, a body with enforcement powers is part of the
executive branch of government. 82
This constitutional purist position, particularly as applied to separa-
tion of powers questions, seems based more on convenience than
principle in light of other positions that the Administration has
taken. The Administration has, of course, nowhere abjured power
79. 43 CONG. Q. 2604 (1985).
80. N. Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1985, at B8, col. 3.
81. Id., Nov. 16, 1985, § 1, at 11, col. 1 ("Meese Says SomeJudges Practice 'Chanic-
leon Jurisprudence' "). For a description of the origins of the Administration's can-
paign and of the rare public responses by Supreme Court Justices to criticism, see id.,
Oct. 28, 1985, at A12, col. 3 ("Administration Trolling for Constitutional Debate").
82. N. Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1985, § 1, at 11, col. 1.
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on grounds that Congress cannot delegate its powers to the Presi-
dent, and, more particularly, it has sought delegated power to exer-
cise a line-item veto of congressionally authorized expenditures.
8 3
Such a veto is an even clearer constitutional departure and abdica-
tion of legislative power than GRH. 84 Because the power to deter-
mine the level of spending was not originally understood as an
executive function, it seems that Mr. Meese is willing to accept at
least one convenient departure from the original understanding,
while rejecting another, the safeguard of an independent delegate.
Coherently, he can hold either his strict "original understanding"
position as to constitutional interpretation or hold a view permitting
broad delegation to the executive branch, not both.
In conclusion, if the Court reviews GRH on delegation
grounds, Chadha may well have created a pressure for coherence
which will tip the balance against such a massive surrender of con-
gressional power. More broadly, it seems unlikely that, however the
Court disposes of GRH, it will return radically to what the Adminis-
tration has occasionally urged as dispositive "original understand-
ing." At least with the Court as presently constituted, ordinary
delegations of ordinary powers seem safe as does the existence of
the independent regulatory agencies.
83. Most recently, President Reagan requested such authority in his 1986 State of
the Union Address. Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of Congress, 22 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 164 (Feb. 10, 1986). See also 43 CONG. Q. 1486 (1985); id. at 1415; N.
Y. Times, May 4, 1984, at A19, col. 1.
84. While an attempt might be made to justify congressionally conferred line-item
veto power as simply confirming inherent executive powers of impoundment, the cases
and scholarly literature spawned by the impoundment crises during the Nixon adminis-
tration suggest that such powers are much too narrow to support the line-item veto. See
Quint, The Separation of Powers under Nixon: Reflections on Constitutional Liberties and the Rule
of Law, 1981 DUKE L.J. 1, 14-17 for a discussion of the case law. For a sampling of the
scholarly literature, see Abascal and Kramer, Presidential Impoundment Part I: Historical
Genesis and Constitutional Framework, 62 GEO. L.J. 1549, 1618 (1974); Mikva and Hertz.
Impoundment of Funds - The Courts, Congress and the President: .4 Constitutional Triangle, 69 Nw.
U.L. REV. 335, 376-89 (1974); Note, Impoundment of Funds, 86 HARY. L. REV. 1505, 1534-
35 (1973).
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